Using a new data set of small public firms in Germany, this paper analyzes the incentive and entrenchment effects associated with managerial equity ownership. The relationship between firm value and insider ownership is found to be nonlinear: at low levels of ownership firm value is positively related to managerial holdings, whereas the relation is negative for higher levels of ownership. Disentangling cash flow and voting rights of managing directors, firm value increases with cash flow ownership of top management but decreases with control, in particular with management voting rights in excess of 25%. Outside blockholders do not appear to play a role in disciplining managements. Codetermination does not affect the value of small firms.
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Introduction
The corporate governance problem of the widely held corporation arising with external finance is well established in finance. It dates back to Berle and Means (1932) and was formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . Due to agency problems caused by the separation of ownership and control, the corporation's dispersed owners have to employ mechanisms to ensure that management provides an adequate return on their inve stment and does not act in self-interest. Incentive alignment can, on the one hand, be achieved by internal control mechanisms, such as the supervisory board monitoring management and providing incentive schemes, such as making management pay contingent on performance. On the other hand, external control mechanisms, like the market for corporate control, large shareholders and financial institutions exerting pressure on management can serve this purpose. However, the concentration of ownership in the hands of any large blockholder might as well bring about the potential of expropriating the remaining dispersed shareholders if blockholders can extract private benefits at the expense of small shareholders. It is still an open empirical question whether the cure is worse than the ailment.
The issue of the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has received great attention, both in theory and empirical research. For one, there is a controversy about the existence of any meaningful cross-sectional relation between these two variables.
For instance, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that ownership concentration is truly endogenous, established by market forces in a value maximizing manner. Himmelberg et al. (1999) do not find changes in management ownership to affect firm performance in a panel framework.
On the other hand, very specific functional forms for the relation between firm value and insider ownership have been derived in theory or were detected in empirical studies.
2 Perhaps the three most prominent functional forms are strictly increasing as implied by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , piecewise linear by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) , and quadratic by Stulz (1988) .
The objective of this paper is twofold: First, drawing on the three mentioned specific forms, differing functional relations between firm value and management ownership are tested with a data set that allows distinguishing cash flow and voting rights of corporate insiders. Secondly, the analysis is extended to jointly assess the effect of insider ownership and other corporate governance forces, namely large outside shareholders and institutional investors.
For that purpose, I construct a new data set that is comprised of German small caps with particular disclosure requirements that help to assemble data on corporate insider holdings over the full range from 0 to 100% ownership. The German market is chosen because the frequent use of different share classes (with and without voting rights), pyramidal ownership structures, and pooling contracts, allows distinguishing between cash flow and control rights of corporate insiders. This data has only become available recently, and traditionally, most empirical studies have been mainly preoccupied with the largest 100 or 200 firms there.
However, for these largest firms, insider holdings do not have to be reported if no single insider owns more than 5% of total voting stock outstanding, as it is the case in most other countries around the globe. Obviously, it is very unlikely that a single manager of a blue chip company will hold a combined share that is larger than 5%. Perhaps this is one of the reasons for the frequent claim that the main conflict potential in insider systems, countries that exhibit high levels of ownership concentration and complicated ownership networks, exists between large (outside) blockholders and dispersed minority shareholders. 3 In this paper, I will show that for small public firms, management equity ownership is an important determinant of firm value as well.
The following section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on managerial ownership and firm performance. Section 3 describes the data set and construction of variables. Empirical results on insider ownership and corporate performance are presented in section 4. Section 5 considers the impact of outside blockholders and codetermination on firm value. Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
In their theory of the ownership structure of the firm, Jensen and Meckling (1976) formalize the relationship between firm value and the portion of shares held by a managing insider.
They consider two types of shareholders with the same rights to receive dividends: the manager-owner and outside shareholders who hold non-voting shares only. The manager maximizes his utility from wealth (the value of his firm stake) and the consumption of nonpecuniary benefits (perquisites) taken from the firm.
In the case where the manager is the single owner of the firm, he allocates the firm's resources efficiently (given his utility), including a positive amount of perk consumption.
However, in the case of outside equity finance, the manager will increase his non-pecuniary benefits ex post, after having sold a part of the firm to outside shareholders, because he bears only a fraction of the costs then. Investors with rational expectations will anticipate and fully price-in this managerial behavior when they buy shares of the firm ex-ante. 4 This can lead to an ex ante inefficient level of investment if the wealth-constrained manager sells shares to fund new projects.
The model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) predicts that, ceteris paribus, firm value is greater the higher the fraction of shares and hence cash flow rights owned by insiders. It is crucial to their analysis that shares of outsiders are not equipped with voting rights. Therefore, the manager-owner's control of the firm and his ability to consume perquisites do not depend on the distribution of shares.
Although Jensen and Meckling do not model explicitly the case of outside stockholders with voting rights, they conjecture that the manager will be concerned when his fractional ownership is below the point that he can be fired and agency costs may be decreased by large shareholders reducing the dispersion of ownership.
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) argue that the convergence-of-interest hypothesis in Jensen and Meckling (the higher management's equity stake in the firm the lower management's tendency to consume firm resources at the expense of other shareho lders)
explains only one of two major effects of managerial ownership on firm value. Managers of poorly performing firms do, in deed, face the threat of being replaced if the shareholders have the voting power to do so. However, the more voting equity mana gers possess, the more difficult it is, if not impossible at certain levels, to dispose of incumbent management.
According to t his entrenchment hypothesis, firm value is lower the larger management's control in the form of voting rights, although likely some minimum level of control is necessary for management to become entrenched. After a certain ownership threshold is reached, there may be no incremental effect on firm value. 4 In this setting, the predictable decline in firm value is fully imposed on the share selling manager ex ante because he cannot commit not to deviate ex post from the initial resource allocation. (The manager may sell anyway if the investments requiring outside finance are profitable enough to make the manager better off despite the agency costs incurred by him. In the absence of highly profitable investment projects, the manager will only cash out if his utility generated by the goods bought with that cash overcompensates the welfare loss due to the agency costs. However, this is beyond the boundaries of the model.) Monitoring and bonding constitute (equivalent) imperfect mechanisms to reduce the manager's consumption of perquisites and hence agency costs, as long as the monitoring or bonding costs are not too high.
In their piecewise linear specification, Morck et al. find the incentive effect (convergenceof-interest hypothesis) to dominate the entrenchment effect for management ownership from 0 to 5% and slightly so from 25% onward. Contrastingly, in the region from 5 to 25% managerial ownership, the entrenchment effect is found to dominate the incentive effect.
Morck et al. point out that entrenchment may not stem exclusively from voting power but also from status as founder, personality, or tenure with the firm. They reckon that these managerial (and other firm) attributes are associated with managerial ownership in the intermediate range,
causing a turning point as low as 5% for the incentive effect to be dominated. However, managerial stock ownership is measured jointly in terms of cash flow and control rights. Due to the one-share-one-vo te principle in their U.S. data it is not possible to disentangle incentives from cash flows and votes. Stulz (1988) analyzes the effect of managerial control of voting rights on firm value in the context of the market for corporate control. The driving force of the model is the voting power of target firm managers when a bidder firm makes a tender offer. Managers receive private benefits of control and may oppose the takeover if they are not sufficiently compensated for it. The atomistic outside (non-ma nagement) shareholders of the target firm cannot collude and have heterogeneous opportunity costs of tendering.
5
The expected supply curve is upward sloping with the premium offered by the bidder, who has to raise that premium if the fraction of voting rights controlled by management is larger.
This yields a quadratic relationship between the ex ante value of the firm and the fraction of voting stock owned by management. For lower levels of management control firm value increases with higher managerial ownership due to the higher premium offered in a takeover attempt. However, as management control increases further, firm value decreases again because the probability of a successful takeover decreases and the premium is naturally bounded above. Firm value is lowest for zero management ownership of voting equity and for management control of 50% and above.
6
The Stulz model is focused on the voting rights arising from managerial stock ownership and does not consider any incentive effects from cash flow rights as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) or disciplining effects on management performance from the market for corporate 5 This can, for instance, be motivated with differing effective tax rates on capital gains. 6 If the gains for the bidder are not large enough to compensate management for the loss of the private benefits, management will never tender and the probability of a successful takeover is zero for management control of 50% and above. This assumption can be relaxed without altering the quadratic relationship as long as managers with higher control stakes do not accept a lower premium. Given that managers who own larger stakes are the ones who enjoy the highest private benefits of control, the probability of a successful takeover will again converge to zero as management control approaches 50%.
control. The hump shaped relation between managerial control and the value of the firm is entirely generated by the takeover premium and probability of success, both depending on the fraction of voting stock held by the target's management. As Morck et al. (1988) 
Methodology and data
The empirical approach of this study is intended to be partial analysis. Critics of this approach argue that the main variables of interest measuring insider ownership and possibly other explanatory variables, assumed to be exogenous, may be endogenous with respect to Q.
9
The common method to address this problem is to specify and estimate a system of 7 See for example Gorton and Schmid (2002a) and Januszewski et al. (2001) . 8 Companies were surveyed on a quarterly basis whether their profits had increased, remained unchanged, or decreased. 9 See for exa mple Demsetz and Villalonga (2002), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) , Cho (1998 the cited studies that attempt to endogenize insider ownership only accommodate a l inear ownership term in the performance (Q) equation. Second, for any system to produce conclusive results, it must be assumed that it is better specified than the single equation model.
Theory, however, is silent about the specification of a system with f irm value, different ownership variables, and further corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, Bøhren and
Ødegaard (2003) show in this context with Norwegian data that signs and significance of coefficient estimates are highly sensitive to the choice of instruments, which are in addition typically difficult to justify in the first place. 11 Considering the small size of the present sample, the lack of good instruments and theoretical guidance regarding the choice of restrictions, the partial approach of this paper to test for the shape of the relation between insider ownership and firm performance is most appropriate.
The set of firms studied in this paper consists of the non-financial companies included in the small and mid cap market index (SMAX), which was introduced by the Deutsche Börse The SMAX started out with 101 companies and contained 114 firms at the end of 1999.
From these firms I excluded three because they were not incorporated in Germany and likely subject to different accounting standards. Further 21 financial firms were excluded. Another 13 firms had to be excluded because it was impossible to obtain information on insider holdings. Consistent with prior research, (two) outliers with Q values larger than ten are also excluded. Two firms that entered the SMAX in the following year but had already disclosed insider ownership were also considered. The final sample consists of 77 German nonfinancial firms with information on insider ownership. Although one can never be sure whether the omission of certain observations may cause a bias in the results, the excluded firms do not seem to be different from the included ones with respect to their observable characteristics.
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Consistent with prior research, corporate insiders are narrowly defined as members of the board of (managing) directors (Vorstand). As an alternative measure of insiders, the members of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) are included in addition. However, it is less clear whether supervisory board members get actively involved in the firm's decision processes and how well they exercise their internal control f unctions. Sometimes supervisory boards are labeled 'passive clubs at the grace of firm managements.
Frequently, family members of a director own substantial additional equity of the firm. One reason may be that the German tax system favors passing on property to descendants before death. Hence, founder board members may allocate parts of their shares to their relatives while they still exercise control. Another likely reason is that the inheritance is split up among several heirs, who do not each want to get involved in the firm. Nevertheless, it is reasonable that family members act in concert. Therefore, one central working assumption is that shares owned by the families of board members are considered as being owned by the board members themselves. Obviously, family members could have conflicts among each other and may not always collude. However, it is likely better to assume that families collude rather than ignoring family ties of the board members with the corresponding ownership. 13 When family memb ers are represented on both the board of managing directors and the supervisory board, the combined shares owned by family members are assigned to the executive board members because most likely a managing director will be supported by his family members or will even exercise their votes.
14 The first of the five sources to collect information on management and supervisory board stock ownership were the annual reports. Unfortunately, only about half of the companies actually published this informatio n in their annual reports. The remaining companies and those with unclear statements 15 were contacted in order to collect the information directly in a questionnaire, the second source of information. The BaFin and the Commerzbank databases provide important complementary information, since obviously, the definition of reported shares held by board members varies considerably.
In most cases, only directly held shares were reported, neglecting shares held by directors via holding shells. In other cases, shares held by family members were attributed. The BaFin database takes into account pooling contracts and shares held via controlled corporations. The
Commerzbank database allows tracing back holdings through pyramidal structures and indicates pooling of votes in some cases. The names of board members were collected directly from the annual reports and compared to the shares attributed to individuals in the other databases.
Finally, when information was still ambiguous and could not be clarified by contacting the firm or when ownership information was inconsistent across data sources I searched the Factiva database, which contains a large set of financial and local newspapers databases, as well as the Reuters and Dow Jones International newswire services with a history of ten years.
Several otherwise unidentified intermediary holding companies could be attributed to their ultimate owners with this tool. These five sources constitute the publicly available information for the set of German companies in this study.
The variables measuring insider ownership explicitly take into account the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights by considering pyramidal structures, pooling contracts, and the differing dividends and voting rights of dual class shares. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate two simple examples.
In Figure 1, In addition, data on the percentage of their own shares held by the sample companies was collected in order to correct all ownership variables for the fact that nobody can vote these shares and dividends are not distributed.
21
All accounting information i s taken from the Datastream company accounts profiles.
Missing information was collected from the annual reports directly. Most fiscal years end at December 31st, but some companies need up to another five months to pub lish their annual 17 Historical files are available on request. 18 Smaller additional stakes are ignored in the figures for ease of exposition. Numbers are rounded. 19 Stock splits and different numbers of outstanding shares are taken into account. 20 Pooling contracts typically mandate that the involved parties 'speak with one voice' on the general shareholder assembly, i.e. they must vote together in the same way. Although the parties may have to find compromises with each other in case of disagreements, the attribution of the control rights is appropriate, since practically no decision can be forced against the will of any involved party. In the present case, it has been officially declared that the pooling contract serves the purpose to prevent a hostile takeover and ensure family control.
reports. T o make sure that the ownership information disclosed in the annual reports was actually publicly known, all securities prices were taken from Datastream as month end prices of June 2000.
Firm value (performance) is measured as an approximation of Tobin's Q, which is ideally measured as q = (market value of equity + market value of debt) / replacement value of assets.
Since debt is usually not traded and replacement value of assets is not available, I follow the This is due to the fact that the firms contained in the SMAX were typically well established firms in traditional businesses (value firms rather than growth firms). Dot-com firms were primarily listed in the Neuer Markt segment and were not part of the SMAX. All firms have positive sales revenues. Average leverage is 28%. 21 For example, if a company holds 10% of its own outstanding shares and any other shareholder holds another 10%, then this shareholder truly controls 11.1%. 22 The denominator is designed to correct for a downward bias in commonly employed empirical measures of Tobin's Q, as reported by Lewellen and Badrinath (1997) . To check for robustness, I also computed the denominator as book value of assets only. The results are not sensitive to this change.
The average FREE FLOAT (in terms of voting rights) is low with 41%, indicating that more than half of the shares with voting rights were held by insiders or blockholders (outside owners). FREE FLOAT is defined as the fraction of outstanding shares with voting rights that are not owned by any known blockholder or board member. When only shares without voting rights are listed (Vorzugsaktien), the value zero is assigned.
Control rights of both top management ( VOTE MANAGER) and both boards combined (VOTE BOARD) range from 0% to 100%, thus indicating that the sample is well suited for testing the n onlinear relationships between insider ownership and firm value over the full range of equity ownership by insiders. Cash flow rights of the two insider groups range from 0 to 87.5% in both cases. Control rights of top management are 33.6% on average, whereas average cash flow rights are only 24.3%. Similarly, on average, control rights of the two boards combined are 47.5% and exceed average cash flow rights, which amount to 34.9%.
Less than half of the firms have outside blockholders, including institutional investors. More than half of the firms are codetermined with labor representatives on the supervisory board.
Insider ownership and corporate performance

The basic models
In a first step to assess the three functional forms between board ownership and firm performance, the linear, the quadratic, and the piecewise linear specifications are tested in in which insider ownership is measured in terms of cash flow rights of both boards, the slope coefficients are positive, negative, positive. However, they are all individually and jointly insignificant. When ownership is measured as control rights of managing directors (regression 3), the three slopes are jointly significant and the fit is high with an adjusted R² of 20%. The estimated shape, however, resembles the hump shape of the quadratic specification. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , which displays the two specifications with the highest fit compared to the other three measures in their class. Altogether, the estimated coefficient for the third piece is negative instead of positive in three of four cases.
An alternative incentive-entrenchment specification
The main explanation for the zigzag shape between firm value and insider ownership discovered by Morck et al. is that two opposing forces work differently against each other over certain intervals of ownership. At low levels of insider ownership, the incentive mechanism dominates (positive slope). At a higher level, management starts to get entrenched (negative slope). Finally, the first effect is to dominate the second again for high ownership levels. Following this reasoning, incentive effects are caused by cash flow stakes, whereas entrenchment becomes possible due to voting power (cont rol captured by the specification that brings control rights into play from 25% on (highest adjusted R²). This supports the reasoning in favor of a higher entrenchment threshold.
For furthe r tests in the remainder of the paper I keep the 25% threshold entrenchmentincentive specification together with the quadratic and piecewise linear specifications, both with variables capturing control rights of managing directors. For the sake of completeness the linear specification with cash flow rights of managing directors is kept as well.
Additional firm-specific variables
In this section, additional independent variables that are theoretically related to firm value or have been found to be associated with Q in prior research are introduced. This is to test whether the nonlinear relations between firm value and managerial ownership is robust to the inclusion of control variables or whether these relations may be spurious due to a problem of omitted variables.
DEBT/ASSETS is the debt ratio measured as book value of debt divided by book value of total assets. Theory predicts a positive effect of the use of debt on firm performance, based on the free cash flow argument of Jensen (1986), the tax-shield effect in Modigliani and Miller (1963) , and the signaling argument in Ross (1977).
McConnell and Servaes (1990) point out that it is easier for individuals to own larger fractions of smaller firms. Hence, size and insider ownership are possib ly negatively related.
This may in turn lead to spurious results for insider ownership and Q, which is usually also negatively associated with size. Size is typically measured by (the log of) book value of assets (or replacement value of assets if available). This may, however, cause an artificially strong negative association of Q with size because the denominator of Q is essentially book value of assets. To mitigate this problem, I measure SIZE as the log of sales.
Edwards and Weichenrieder (1999) note that German firms have considerable discretion over the use of provisions. In particular, sizable pension provisions may serve as a cheap source of investment finance. Edwards and Weichenrieder argue that the use of discretional provisions biases Q upward due to the downward bias of book value of equity capital used in the denominator of their measure of Q. This is not the case for the measure of Q used in this paper with book value of assets entering the denominator. By contrast, drawing on Jensen's free cash flow argument, if provisions are used instead of debt, then they may rather lead to lower firm value. PROVISIONS/ASSETS measures the relative importance of provisions and is defined as book value of provisions divided by book value of total assets.
Finally, a set of industry dummies is introduced to allow for industry specific leve ls of Q due to different profitability and growth opportunities across industries. Industry indicator variables are defined according to Datastream level three industrial classifications for primary activity.
The multiple regressions of Q on managerial cash flow and voting rights variables in the linear, quadratic, piecewise linear, and incentive-entrenchment specifications together with control variables are shown in Table 3 . For each ownership specification (panels A to D), all control variables, except for the industry effects, are included jointly in regression (1). In regression (2) only the control variables that are significant in (1) are kept. The same procedure is applied when industry dummies are included in regressions (3) and (4).
The estimates shown in Table 3 produce three major results. First, the addition of control variables improves goodness of fit up to remarkable 46 to 52% when industry dummies are included. Second, debt ratio and provisions over assets are insignificant across all specifications, whereas SIZE is highly significant. Likewise, the industry effects are always highly significant jointly. (1) and (2) without industry dummies, as well as in regressions (3) and (4) with industry indicators. When tested individually, the quadratic terms are significant at the 5% level in all regressions. Similarly, the piecewise l inear ownership terms (panel C) are still jointly significant throughout, but not individually. Again, the coefficient for the second slope from 5 to 25% voting rights is positive and thus the shape resembles the quadratic form rather than the specific zigzag form detected in Mock et al. (1988) , where cash flow ownership equals voting rights.
Although the goodness of fit is of same order as for the quadratic and piecewise linear specifications, the support for the incentive-entrenchment specification (panel D) is much stronger based on individual and joint significance levels. The cash flow term is positive and significant in regressions (1) and (2) and highly significant when industry effects are included in regressions (3) and (4). The control term starting at 25% voting rights is highly significant in all regressions. The Wald test indicates joint significance at the 5% level in regressions (1) and (2) and high significance i n regressions (3) and (4), the latter with the best fit overall.
Therefore, the evidence is consistent with the view that management equity ownership creates both positive incentive effects through the associated cash flow rights and negative entrenchment effects for larger control stakes.
Outside blockholders and codetermination
In this section, the impact of codetermination and outside blockholders on firm value is analyzed. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) Table 4 displays the output of regressing Q on the voting share fractions held by outside owners and managements, codetermination, and further control variables. Across all specifications, control of outside owners lumped together has a significant negative impact on firm value. When broken down to control to INSTITUTIONAL and OTHER BLOCKHOLDERS, the signs of the coefficients are still negative but no more generally significant at the 5% level. Altogether, this is consistent with the view that large outside owners do not perform a firm value enha ncing corporate governance function supposed to counterbalance the power of managements.
To investigate further whether outsiders are able to form blocking coalitions with insiders, pivotal stakes are considered, i.e. the case that the control stakes of insiders and outsiders taken together exceed the control thresholds 25% or 50% when the individual stakes fall below the respective threshold. However, this is rarely the case.
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The effect of CODETERMINATION is far from significant in all regressions. Therefore, the negative effect of codetermination found in previous studies with larger firms in Germany does not generalize to this sample of small listed firms. Possibly, employees and their representatives have more influence in larger firms, which get more attention from trade unions and the public in general. 27 It may be more difficult for employees to enforce their interests in smaller firms that are more likely to be family controlled or managed by a member of the founder family. To address this possibility, the sample i s split in half according to size (sales) and all equations in table 4 are re-estimated for the 39 larger firms. Then the effect of codetermination is negative and significant at the 5% level in three out of eight cases (results not tabulated). 28 This supports the conjecture that the effect of codetermination on firm value may only matter for larger firms.
More importantly, the previous results regarding insider ownership are not affected by the inclusion of blockholder and codetermination effects. The linear specification is still insignificant and the Wald tests for joint significance of the ownership terms indicate even higher significance for the quadratic, the piecewise linear, and the incentive-entrenchment specifications.
Conclusion
This paper provides a direct test of three prominent hypothesized relations between management ownership of equity and firm value. For that purpose, a new sample that is particularly well suited for this analysis is constructed. The firms under study are small public firms with widely varying degrees of insider ownership and control.
The distinction between the ownership of cash flow and control rights by corporate insiders is found to be important. An alternative incentive-entrenchment specification is suggested that contains cash flow ownership of managing directors as a linear term and a control effect from 25% voting rights onward. Thus, disentangling cash flow and control rights of managing directors, firm performance (Q) increases with cash flow ownership of top management, but decreases with control, in particular when management voting rights exceed 25%.
When imposing a piecewise linear relation (+,+,-) or the quadratic structure as implied by Stulz (1988) , the data are described fairly well, too. These forms are, however, less robust than the incentive-entrenchment specification with respect to the inclusion of size and industry effects as control variables. Moreover, the piecewise linear relation in terms of managerial voting rights is no longer comparable to the specific zigzag form (+,-,+) detected by Morck et al. (1988) , where cash flow ownership equals voting rights. Furthermore, the pure linear functional form in terms of cash flows implied by Jensen and Meckling (1976) , ignoring separate effects of control, is rejected. Overall, the relation between managerial ownership and firm value is found to be nonlinear.
The result that excessive voting rights are associated with lower firm value is consistent with Ehrhardt and Nowak (2003), who find that family owned German firms that issue stock in dual-class IPOs underperform their ordinary share counterparts significantly in the long run, likely due to the extraction of private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
Outside blockholders do not appear to play a role in disciplining managements. The aggregated control stakes held by blockholders are negatively associated with firm value, which is, however, no more generally significant across ownership specifications when broken down into institutional and other blockholders.
Codetermination does not affect firm value overall. This contrasts the results of Gorton and Schmid (2002ab) , who find a strong negative effect. This is likely due to the fact that their sample consists of the largest German firms, whereas the firms in this paper are much smaller.
Arguably, employees represent their interests more aggressively in larger firms, which are to a lesser extent family controlled and get more attention from trade unions and the public in general.
This raises the question about the generality of the results. One should bear in mind that the firms studied in this paper are special in many respects. First, they belong to a group of firms that chose to participate in the listing on a special quality market segment of the German stock exchange in order to receive more attention from the investment community. To do so, they agreed to raise their disclosure standards. Typically, these are 'solid' firms with an established track record but without spectacular growth stories. Second, in terms of market capitalization, the firms are relatively small. This makes them particularly suited to test theories that have implications on firm value for differing degrees of insider ownership, because smaller firms are naturally characterized by much more variation in the ownership stakes of insiders. At the same time, this means that the results cannot be generalized to larger firms. Furthermore and consistent with prior research, financial firms were excluded. Moreover, entrenchment thresholds are l ikely dependent on the national legal framework and standard of investor protection. Therefore, the results presented here may only apply to the small, listed 'quality' firms in Germany.
Another possible concern is the relevance of the Stulz (1988) model for the German market, which is not known as an active market for hostile takeovers. Rather, outsiders appear to accumulate hostile stakes silently and form coalitions of large investors to gain control, as suggested by Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) . Nevertheless, there has been a small number of hostile takeover attempts, some of which were successful. 29 The important point is that the mere threat of a hostile takeover is already sufficient to make the Stulz model relevant. The fact that the firms studied in this paper were obliged to accept the German Takeover Code as a SMAX listing requirement, further supports the assertion that the possibility of a hostile takeover cannot be ruled out ex ante. Q is an approximation of Tobin's Q computed as (market value of equity + book value of debt) / (book value of assets -book value of liabilities + book value of debt). CF MANAGERS is the combined cash flow ownership from the shareholdings of a company's management board (Vorstand) and their families. VOTE MANAGERS is the fraction of votes controlled by the members of a company's management board and their families. CF BOARD and VOTE BOARD are defined likewise, but include in addition cash flow and voting rights of the members of the supervisory board and their families. When a family was represented on both managing and supervisory boards, then all the family's cash flow and voting rights were attributed to the management board. OUTSIDE OWNERS is the sum of the votes controlled by outside (non-board) blockholders. INSTITUTIONAL is the sum of votes controlled by banks, insurances, and investment funds. All cash flow and voting rights variables are expressed as fractions of total outstanding cash flow or voting rights, corrected for shares held by the company itself. FREE FLOAT is defined as the fraction of outstanding shares with voting rights that are not owned by any known blockholder or board members. When only shares without voting rights are listed (Vorzugsaktien), the value zero is assigned. NUMBER OF SUPERVISORY BOARD MEMBERS is the total number of supervisory board members representing either shareholders or workers. NUMBER OF LABOR REPESENTATIVES ON SUPERVISORY BOARD is the number of employee representatives on the supervisory board. ASSETS is the book value of total assets (million €). SALES are total revenues (million €). DEBT is book value of total debt (million €). PROVISIONS are total provisions including the items pension provisions and other provisions (million €). DEBT/ASSETS is book value of debt scaled by book value of assets. PROVISIONS/ASSETS is provisions scaled by book value of assets. The number of observations is 77. 
